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SECURITY SCANNERS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Gregory S. McNeal†

INTRODUCTION
In this article, I will take a comparative look at regulations governing the use of airport full-body security scanners. A comparative
look is valuable because the use of scanners, while controversial, is
not solely an American phenomenon. In fact, the European Union
(EU) analyzed the implementation of security scanners and placed
regulatory controls on their use before the controversy in the United
States erupted. This essay proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I explain
the EU regulations governing the use of security scanners. In Part II, I
present an overview of relevant U.S. laws governing the use of security scanners and demonstrate the similarity between the challenges and
solutions implemented under the European and U.S. fielding of security scanners. I conclude by arguing that the concerns raised by security scanners can be sufficiently mitigated with advanced technology
that maximizes the interest in security while also protecting individual
liberty.
Prior to discussing the law dealing with security scanners, it is
necessary to provide some background on the plots which prompted
their implementation. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, governments around the world rushed to address the
strategic vulnerabilities, particularly in intelligence and aviation, made
so apparent on that fateful day. A massive effort ensued in the United
States to reorganize the infrastructure and increase the ability of government to prevent another terrorist attack. The flow of resources to
executive agencies was dramatically increased under the assumption
that it would enhance their operational capabilities. The United States
was not alone in these efforts. Europe, Canada, and other nations
around the world took note of the devastation caused by only nineteen
†
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hijackers and took steps to restructure civil aviation security standards. Despite these efforts, the chief concern for politicians, intelligence, and security officials became not if, but when and how severe
the next terrorist strike would be.
Since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda and its off-shoots have
evolved, changing their tactics in response to U.S. and European security practices. While al-Qaeda took enormous pride in its ability to
successfully carry out the 9/11 attacks,1 it also knew that such an opportunity would not remain available for very long, especially after
security measures on civilian aircraft changed to prevent terrorists
from taking control of the cockpit. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups retained their obsession with exploiting the
vulnerabilities unique to civil aviation. Instead of aiming to take control of airplanes and use them as weapons, al-Qaeda realized it could
instill fear by detonating bombs onboard civilian airplanes while in
flight. On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid (popularly known as the
“Shoe Bomber”), attempted to detonate explosives concealed in his
shoe while on board American Airlines Flight 63.2 In 2006, British
law enforcement uncovered a plot to detonate liquid explosives that
were to be carried on board seven transatlantic flights travelling from
the U.K. to the United States and Canada.3 These two plots stick out
in the minds of many air travelers because the attempts prompted security authorities to require passengers to remove their shoes at
checkpoints and institute the 3-1-1 liquid and gel policy.4
There have been several foiled attempts in the past decade; however, two attempts in particular drew special attention from intelligence and security officials. Both plots were ultimately traced back to
a group that many intelligence officials now believe constitutes the

1
See, e.g., LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE
ROAD TO 9/11 358 (2006) (“The accomplishment of striking the two towers was an
overwhelming signal of God’s favor . . . .”); Mike Boettcher, Detainees Reveal bin
Laden’s
Reaction
to
Attacks,
CNN.COM
(Sept.
10,
2002),
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-10/us/ar911.osama.exclusive_1_bin-terrorist-leaderkhalid-shaikh-mohammed (recounting bin Laden’s behavior while events unfolded,
which included him weeping, praying, telling his followers to “‘Be patient,’” and
holding up two, three, then four fingers before each subsequent plane crash).
2
Michael Elliott, The Shoe Bomber’s World, TIME, Feb. 25, 2002, at 46, 46.
3
John Ward Anderson & Karen DeYoung, Plot to Bomb U.S.-Bound Jets Is
Foiled, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at A1, A11.
4
See Make Your Trip Better Using 3-1-1, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/311/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012); Sheldon H. Jacobson,
Watching Through the “I”s of Aviation Security, 5 J. TRANSP. SECURITY 35 (2012).
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greatest terrorist threat to the United States, and civil aviation in particular: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).5
The first notable attempt was the assassination plot by Abdullah
Hasan al-Asiri against Saudi Arabian Prince and Chief of counterterrorism Mohammed bin Nayef.6 Al-Asiri detonated a carefully concealed explosive device that tore the terrorist operative’s body into
seventy pieces.7 Questions about the assassination attempt quickly
mounted. How was al-Asiri able to get a bomb so close to such an
important member of the Saudi family—the chief of counterterrorism
no less? Al-Asiri had been searched several times, he had spent 24
hours with the prince’s guards, and had even flown on the prince’s
aircraft.8 Less than four months later, on December 25, 2009, a twenty-three year old Nigerian man named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
(commonly known as the “Christmas Day Bomber” or the “Underwear Bomber”) boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route from
Amsterdam to Detroit.9 As the flight was approaching Detroit, Abdulmutallab went to the bathroom where he remained for approxi5

See Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), NAT’L
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last visited
Jan. 4, 2012); Jonathan Masters, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaedaarabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369 (“President Barack Obama has described AQAP as ‘alQaeda’s most active operational affiliate,’ echoing an acknowledgment from U.S.
counterterrorism officials that the threat from AQAP has supplanted that of the alQaeda core.”); FRANK J. CILLUFFO & CLINTON WATTS, HOMELAND SEC. POLICY INST.,
YEMEN & AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: EXPLOITING A WINDOW OF
COUNTERTERRORISM
OPPORTUNITY
(June
24,
2011),
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrief_yemenaqap.pdf
(“The
Foreign
Operations Unit’s special knowledge of the U.S. and unique destructive capabilities
make AQAP an immediate threat to the U.S.”); see generally SAMUEL LINDO,
MICHAEL SCHODER & TYLER JONES, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., AL QAEDA IN
THE
ARABIAN
PENINSULA
(July
2011),
available
at
http://csis.org/files/publication/110722_Lindo_AQAP_AQAMCaseStudy3.pdf
(describing past and future threats of AQAP).
6
See Michael Slackman, Would-Be Killer Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudis Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, at A9; David Gardner, Air Passengers Face Full Body Xrays After Suicide Bombers Hide Devices INSIDE Their Bodies, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 8,
2009)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1218562/Bombers-hide-devicesinside-bodies-Travellers-Europe-face-body-X-rays.html.
7
See Gardner, supra note 6.
8
See id.
9
See Mark Hosenball, The Radicalization of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
NEWSWEEK
(Jan.
1,
2010,
7:00
PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/01/the-radicalization-of-umarfarouk-abdulmutallab.html; From Shoes to Soft Drinks to Underpants: The Attempted
Bombing of an Airliner Highlights Gaps in Intelligence-Sharing and Airport Security,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2010, at 21, 21 [hereinafter From Shoes to Soft Drinks].
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mately twenty minutes.10 After returning to his seat with a blanket
covering his midsection, passengers sitting nearby began to hear popping noises and watched as Abdulmutallab’s leg caught fire.11 A passenger who was sitting close by managed to subdue Abdulmutallab
while flight attendants used fire extinguishers to put out the flames.12
It was revealed shortly thereafter that Abdulmutallab had attempted to
detonate a six-inch package of PETN13 and triacetone triperoxide
(TAPN) that had been sewn into his underwear.14 It was also revealed
through his confession that he had been trained and directed by
AQAP, which subsequently claimed credit for the attempt.15
Both attempts originated in Yemen, the headquarters of AQAP.
Both attempts utilized the explosive powder, PETN. Most importantly however, both attempts concealed explosive devices in such a way
that standard search practices, by hand or by metal detector, would not
reveal their presence. For this reason, these two attempts had a major
impact on intelligence and security officials. Although TSA officials
were already exploring the use of X-ray systems at security checkpoints, these attempts prompted policymakers to expedite the process
of deploying such technology to airports across the United States,
Europe, and Canada. It is in the context of these types of plots that
government officials are analyzing the use of security scanners.
I.

EUROPEAN UNION REGULATIONS

After 9/11, the EU took steps to review and reorganize aviation
policies and procedures into a common aviation security framework
for EU member states. The European Parliament and Council insti10

See Hosenball, supra note 9.
See id.; From Shoes to Soft Drinks, supra note 9, at 21; Kenneth Chang,
Explosive on Flight 253 Is Among Most Powerful, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A14.
12
See Hosenball, supra note 9; From Shoes to Soft Drinks, supra note 9, at
21.
13
See generally Malcolm W. Browne, Readily Available, PETN Is Easily
Molded and Hidden, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at B6 (providing information on
accessibility and use of PETN).
14
See From Shoes to Soft Drinks, supra note 9, at 21; Aliyah Shahid, What is
PETN? US-Bound Packages Contained the Explosive, Similar to Christmas Day
Underwear
Bomber,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Oct.
30,
2010)
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-10-30/news/27079712_1_suspicious-packagespetn-semtex; Indictment at 2, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2010), 2010 WL 229849.
15
See Hosenball, supra note 9; Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror
Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2009)
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html; From Shoes to Soft Drinks,
supra note 9, at 21.
11
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tuted Regulation (EC) 2320/2002, which was among the first of such
measures to establish basic security standards for civil aviation common to all EU member states in order to prevent “acts of unlawful
interference.”16 Regulation (EC) 300/2008 has since superseded Regulation (EC) 2320/2002;17 however, the provisions regarding passenger screening have remained largely unchanged. The opening provision of Regulation 2320/2002 proclaimed that, “[t]he criminal acts
committed in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 show
that terrorism is one of the greatest threats to the ideals of democracy
and freedom and the values of peace, which are the very essence of
the European Union.”18
The minimal standards required by the regulation are rooted in the
security provisions set forth in Annex 17 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.19 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency tasked with regulating international air travel, first outlined international aviation standards in the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, which was signed by fifty-two nations at the Chicago Convention on December 7, 1944.20 In
March 1974, the ICAO adopted Standards and Recommended Practices for international civil aviation, which were designated as Annex
17 of the Chicago Convention.21 Although there have been eight sub16
Council Regulation 2320/2002, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 355) 1, 2 (EC) [hereinafter
Regulation
2320/2002],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:355:0001:0021:EN:PDF.
17
Council Regulation 300/2008, On Common Rules in the Field of Civil
Aviation Security and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002, 2008 O.J. (L 97) 72,
72 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 300/2008], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:097:0072:0084:EN:PDF.
18
Regulation 2320/2002, supra note 16, at Preamble.
19
See Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at Preamble (“It is desirable, in
the interests of civil aviation security generally, to provide the basis for a common
interpretation of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
of 7 December 1944.”).
20
See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1207–11, 15 U.N.T.S. 360–72 [hereinafter Chicago Convention], available at
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf. For a more detailed
history of the Chicago Convention and the work of the ICAO with respect to aviation
security, see generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in
the War Against Terrorism, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 649 (2002); see also R.I.R.
Abeyratne, Some Recommendations for a New Legal and Regulatory Structure for the
Management of the Offense of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation, 25 TRANSP.
L.J. 115 (1998).
21
Annex
17,
INT’L
CIVIL
AVIATION
ORG.,
http://www2.icao.int/en/AVSEC/SFP/Pages/Annex17.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
Annex 17, entitled “Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference,” has been amended several times including shortly after 9/11.
Dempsey, supra note 20, at 677 n.140, 690.
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sequent editions of Annex 17, the original version outlined its fundamental purpose in the preamble, declaring the following:
the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may
be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international
air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of
opportunity and operated soundly and economically.22

In accordance with this purpose, Regulation 2320/2002 set forth
basic tenets to establish secure civil aviation programs. The regulation requires each EU member state to adopt a national civil aviation
security program, a quality control program, and a training program.
On the subject of passenger screening, section 4.1 of the Annex to
Regulation 2320/2002 describes methods that EU member states must
employ in order to satisfy the minimum security standards for air
travel. In short, passengers may be screened by hand or by using
walk-through metal detection (WTMD) equipment.23 Passengers
must be searched by hand if they trigger the WTMD alarm. 24 Also,
continuous random searches must be carried out for passengers who
do not trigger the WTMD alarms.25 The regulation, however, does
not require the use of X-ray equipment for passenger screening. Although the regulation provides the purpose and manner in which X-ray
equipment should be operated, it only does so in the context of baggage screening.26 It is also important to note that while section 4.1
allows for screening by hand or WTMD, airports need not provide
passengers with a choice of screening method. In other words, airports are not required to screen a passenger by hand if the passenger
refuses to be scanned.27
There are two provisions that form the basis for EU member states
to deploy X-ray equipment specifically for screening passengers. The
first such provision can be found in Article 6 of Regulation (EC)
300/2008. Article 6 allows member states to “apply more stringent
22

Chicago Convention, supra note 20, at Preamble.
Regulation 2320/2002, supra note 16, at 4.1(1) (a)-(b).
24
Id. at 4.1(1)(b).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 4.3 (“Screening of Cabin Baggage”), 5.2 (“Screening of Hold Baggage”), and 13.2 (“Standards and Testing Procedures for X-ray Equipment Applicability”).
27
See Olga Mironenko, Body Scanners Versus Privacy and Data Protection,
27 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 232, 236 (2011) (noting that UK government does not
propose to provide alternative screening method for passengers who decline the
security scanning method).
23
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measures than the common basic standards referred to in Article 4.”28
Article 6 clearly gives EU member states a great deal of discretion in
employing methods that they feel will best enhance security. The
only limitation to this discretion is that in employing such methods,
EU member states are required to “act on the basis of a risk assessment and in compliance with Community law. [The] measures shall
be relevant, objective, non-discriminatory and proportional to the risk
that is being addressed.”29 The regulation does not give further detail
on the meaning of relevance, objectivity, nondiscrimination, or proportionality beyond what is provided in Article 6.
The other provision that allows EU member states to justify the
use of X-ray technology for screening passengers can be found in
Chapter 12.8 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) 185/2010. Chapter
12.8.1 provides that:
A Member State may allow a method of screening using new
technologies other than those laid down in this Regulation, provided that: (a) it is being used for the purpose of evaluating a new
method of screening; and (b) it will not negatively affect the overall level of security being attained; and (c) appropriate information
that a trial is being conducted shall be given to those affected, including passengers.

Chapter 12.8 is another area in the regulations that provides member states some discretion in their use of security practices because the
regulations recognize that screening technologies “will develop over
time.”30 However, there are protocols that EU member states must
comply with in order to test such technologies. For instance, a member state is required to provide written notification to the European
Commission (EC) and member states, four months in advance of the
use of any new technologies that are not specifically addressed by the
regulations.31 The EC then has three months to approve the new technology that the member state intends to utilize.32 If the EC gives a
positive reply or fails to respond within that three month period, the
member state is authorized to use the technology for an evaluation

28

Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at art. 6(1).
Id.
30
Commission Regulation 185/2010, Laying Down Detailed Measures for
the Implementation of the Common Basic Standards on Aviation Security, Preamble,
2010
O.J
(L
55)
1,
4
(EU),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:055:0001:0055:EN:PDF.
31
Id. at 12.8.2.
32
Id. at 12.8.3.
29
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period that cannot exceed eighteen months.33 However, a twelvemonth extension may be granted if the member state provides adequate justification.34 The EC retains the right to suspend the use of
any new technology if it feels that the new screening method fails to
provide adequate security.35 On September 5, 2008, the EC issued a
draft regulation to the European Parliament and Council (EP) to develop legislative screening requirements. In response, the Parliament
requested that the EC conduct an impact assessment in order to address fundamental rights and health concerns raised by the use of security scanners.36 In formulating its assessment, the EC was asked to
consult the European Data Protection Supervisor, the Article 29
Working Party, and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights,37 each of
which had expressed reservations in 2009 about the use of security
scanners.38 The EC agreed to conduct the impact assessment and
dropped the provisions on security scanners from its legislative proposal, which became Regulation (EC) 272/2009.39
The EC issued a report on June 15, 2010, addressing the use of
security scanners at EU airports.40 Many interpret the EC Communication as wholly endorsing the widespread use of security scanners
across Europe.41 While the report seeks to address fundamental rights
33

Id. at 12.8.3, 12.8.4.
Id. at 12.8.4. Commission Regulation (EU) 185/2010 does not allow
evaluation periods to exceed 30 months. Id. at 12.8.7.
35
Id. at 12.8.6.
36
See European Parliament Resolution of 23 October 2008 on the Impact of
Aviation Security Measures and Body Scanners on Human Rights, Privacy, Personal
Dignity and Data Protection. European Parliament, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6
TA(2008)0521 (2008) [hereinafter EP Resolution of 23 October 2008]; Paul De Hert
& Rocco Bellanova, Mobility Should Be Fun. A Consumer (Law) Perspective on
Border Check Technology, 11 SCI. WORLD J. 490, 492 (2011).
37
See EP Resolution of 23 October 2008, supra note 37; De Hert & Bellanova, supra note 36, at 492.
38
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU Airports, at ¶ 31, COM (2010) 311
final (June 15, 2010) [hereinafter EC Communication], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0311:FIN:EN:PDF.
39
Commission Regulation 272/2009, 2009 O.J (L 91) 7, 10 (EC), available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:091:0007:0013:EN:PDF.
40
See generally EC Communication, supra note 38; De Hert & Bellanova,
supra note 36, at 492.
41
See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the
‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the Use of Security Scanners at EU Airports,’ 2011 O.J. (C 107) 49, 50 [hereinafter
EESC
Opinion],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:107:0049:0052:EN:PDF
(“[T]here are doubts as to whether the main objective of the legislative act in question
34
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and health concerns, its primary goal is to steer the EU security scanner policy away from the ad hoc basis it currently operates under and
establish a clear legal framework for screening requirements and safeguards.
A.

Human Dignity, Privacy, and Data Protection

In the process of standardizing security measures, the European
Parliament and Council recognized the need to address human rights
in general and civil liberties in particular. Regulations 2320/2002 and
300/2008 clearly observe and support the principles established by the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Nevertheless, questions
continue to be raised as to whether the use of security scanners at EU
airports violates any provisions of the CFR or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). These instruments deal primarily
with health, human dignity, privacy and data protection, and discrimination.
1.

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Those invoking the EU CFR typically reference human dignity
(Article 1); respect for private and family life (Article 7); protection of
personal data (Article 8); freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
(Article 10); nondiscrimination (Article 21); the rights of the child
(Article 24); and, ensuring a high level of human health protection in
the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities
(Article 35).
Article 1 on human dignity and Article 8 on the protection of personal data have been the primary source of ammunition for critics of
security scanners. Article 1 of the CFR declares, “[h]uman dignity is
inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”42 Article 8 provides
the following:

(the widespread introduction in all EU airports of ‘Security Scanners’ is the most
suitable way to achieve maximum aviation security.”). Cf. Sarah Ludford, European
Commission is Fence-Sitting on Body Scanners, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (June 24, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jun/24/europeancommission-fence-sitting-body-scanners (“I was expecting some strong conclusions
rooted in a rigorous weighing up of pros, cons and costs. Instead we get a fig leaf of
fence-sitting masking a firm intention to legitimize their EU-wide use.”). For more
on the EESC Opinion, see infra notes 86–103 and accompanying text.
42
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (C
364)
9,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2000:364:0001:0022:EN:PDF.
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1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or
her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an
independent authority.43

Using security scanners at airports has generated a great deal of
controversy because the scanner technology allows systems to generate an image of the passenger without clothing.44 Some critics of security scanners maintain that the technology subjects passengers to
“virtual strip searches,”45 while other commentators dismiss this characterization as ridiculous and point out that there can be no nudity
when no skin is featured in the virtual image. 46 Nevertheless, the EC
Communication concedes that security scanners have human dignity
implications because use of the technology can “reveal a detailed display of the human body (even blurred) . . . and medical conditions,
such as prostheses and diapers.”47 Moreover, there are Article 8 data
protection48 concerns over the possibility that security personnel will
have the ability to store these sensitive images.
43

Id. art. 8, at 10.
See BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41502, CHANGES IN AIRPORT
PASSENGER SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 5 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41502.pdf;
see also EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 32, 33 (“What are Security
Scanners and what can be their role in aviation security.”).
45
ACLU Backgrounder on Body Scanners and “Virtual Strip Searches,”
ACLU
(Jan.
8,
2010),
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclubackgrounder-body-scanners-and-virtual-strip-searches.
46
Controlling When You Relieve Yourself, Not Body Scan, Invades Privacy,
DENNIS
PRAGER
SHOW
(Jan.
5,
2010),
http://www.dennisprager.com/columns.aspx?g=5bf1740d-cd49-4815-a857bebbdd9e1a35&url=controlling_when_you_relieve_yourself,_not_body_scan,_invad
es_privacy.
47
EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 50 (discussing “[t] he protection of
human dignity.”); see Mironenko, supra note 27, at 236 (“The process reveals a person’s gender and the precise construction of his or her body, together any usually
concealed physical features that the ‘owner’ of the body in question may wish to
conceal from strangers or even friends and family. Moreover, screening technologies
are capable of revealing very sensitive areas of a person’s private life, medical aids
and conditions, such as prostheses, breast implants, bras with gel pads, diapers, menstrual pads, etc.”) (citation omitted).
48
See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
44
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In light of these concerns, there are criteria against which the
scanning should be assessed. It must be determined (1) whether the
measure proposed is appropriate to achieve the objective, (2) whether
it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective, and (3)
whether there is less intrusive means of achieving the objective.49
Limited use of security scanners seems to meet the criteria in this
case. The purpose of the scanners is to detect prohibited nonmetallic
items that could pose a security threat.50 Critics contend that the
method goes beyond what is necessary; however, there are limited
ways in which security officials can effectively detect concealed
nonmetallic items.51
The EC Communication made a number of recommendations to
address human dignity, data protection, and other fundamental rights
concerns.52 The recommendations advocate reducing interaction between screener and passenger in order to make the process as anonymous as possible.53 Reviewers should not be able to see the passenger
being screened, link the image to any person in any way, or store the
image after the passenger has been cleared.54 Furthermore, only reviewers of the same gender as the passenger should conduct detailed
reviews when necessary.55 The recommendations also mention the
possibility of having mannequin or stick figure representations of the
passenger,56 which seems to be where the technological trend is heading due to the backlash over privacy and human dignity concerns.
There are other technological innovations that may also mitigate
privacy concerns. For example, the EC Communication discusses the

Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40
[hereinafter
Directive
95/46/EC],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF.
49
See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 51 (addressing “[d]ata protection.”).
50
See ELIAS, supra note 44, at 2; see also How It Works: Advanced Imaging
Technology,
TRANSP.
SECURITY
ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/how_it_works.shtm (last visited Jan. 5, 2012)
(“Advanced imaging technology safely screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives and other objects concealed under layers of
clothing without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public safe.”).
51
See ELIAS, supra note 44, at 9–10; Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233.
52
See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 2.3 (addressing “[c]oncerns
raised in relation to the use of Security Scanners at EU airports”).
53
See id. at ¶ 54 (outlining “[p]ossible ways to address the protection of
human dignity, data protection and other fundamental rights concerns”).
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id. at ¶ 53.
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use of Automatic Threat Recognition (ATR) software,57 which can be
used to assist screeners in identifying threatening items or carry out
interpretation functions automatically.58 The efficacy of ATR software continues to be tested, but the EC believes that ATR software is
ready for a trial in airports.59
2.

European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) of 1950

Although the EC Communication and the majority of current
opinions on security scanners address human dignity, privacy, and
health concerns in the context of the EU CFR, it is still important to
consider the ECHR. It has a number of provisions60 that correspond
with articles from the CFR. In the context of security scanners, however, Article 8 is of particular importance. The ECHR states that,
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.”61 Furthermore, the ECHR provides:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.62

Interpreting Article 8 of the ECHR, especially in regard to security scanners, is a difficult task. Some scholars conclude that the European Court of Human Rights applies a very broad interpretation of

57

See id. at ¶¶ 57, 58 (“ATR is based on specific software, designed to recognise dangerous and forbidden objects.”).
58
See id. at ¶57. Screeners are assisted with the identification of threatening
objects by “computer algorithms included within the screening protocol [that] allow
for automatic identification of threat objects and anomalies instantly, at the time a
passenger exits the portal. If an anomaly is identified, a screener is alerted to provide
secondary screening.” Tim Hudson, Advanced Passenger Screening Technologies:
‘It’s Not Just About the Passenger,’ 5 J. AIRPORT MGMT. 114, 121 (2011).
59
See EC Communication, supra note 38, at 13.
60
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20213/volume-213-I-2889English.pdf.
61
Id. at art. 8(1).
62
Id. at art. 8(2).
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what Article 8 protects.63 The concept of private life can extend to a
person’s body, social status, health, and a number of other personal
identifiers. Even if images are prevented from being stored, they are
still collected and analyzed for an amount of time that is arguably
sufficient to violate a passenger’s privacy.64 Yet these considerations
must still be scrutinized under the exceptions provided by Article
8(2).
There have also been objections based on Article 8 of the ECHR
because of the limited methods of screening offered to passengers. 65
As noted above, European airports are under no obligation to screen
passengers by hand who refuse to partake in the security scanning
method. The UK government for instance, does not provide such an
alternative.66
B.

Standards and Effectiveness

The issue of security scanner effectiveness has a direct consequence on determining whether its use violates Article 8 of the EU
CFR and Article 8 of the ECHR. As mentioned above, the use of security scanners is not specifically regulated by the EU. However,
Article 6 of Regulation (EC) 300/2008 provides the basis for EU
member states to apply more stringent security measures, which a
number of European nations have done with the introduction of security scanners. Article 6 states that such measures are permissible if

63

See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 237 (discussing S and Marper v. United
Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581; according to the court, “the concept of ‘private
life,’” inter alia, “covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person; it can
embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity; elements such
as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life . . . .” Id.
64
See id. at 241 (noting that scanners need to save the images for later inspection in the event that a scanner unit fails to detect contraband that is later used in
terrorist attack). Although security scanner manufacturers claim that the image storage feature can be turned off at the customer’s request, which TSA claims to have
done with the scanner units deployed, “these statements contradict the TSA’s own
Procurement Specs which specifically require that the machines have the ability to
record and transmit images, even if those features might be initially turned off on
delivery.” Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SECURITY, ADMIN.,
PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATION FOR WHOLE BODY IMAGER DEVICES FOR CHECKPOINT
OPERATIONS,
FINAL
VERSION
1.02
(2008),
available
at
http://epic.org/open_gov/foia/TSA_Procurement_Specs.pdf.
65
See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 236 (noting that the UK government
does not offer an alternative method of screening for those who decline the security
scanner method).
66
See id.
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their use is “relevant, objective, non-discriminatory and proportional
to the risk that is being addressed.”67
Considering the fact that two terrorist attacks provided the primary impetus for using security scanners at airports,68 the appropriate
question is whether security scanners actually could have prevented
these attacks. Such an inquiry can help determine whether the use of
security scanners is in fact “relevant . . . and proportional to the risk
that is being addressed.”69
It is unclear whether security scanners would have detected the
explosives used in either the attempt on al-Asiri or the Christmas Day
Bombing by attempted by Abdulmutallab described above.70 In Abdulmutallab’s case, security scanner manufacturers stated that the
scanners “would not have detected the underwear bomb because it
was in a light powdered form and the detonator was hidden in a body
cavity.”71 Of course, the government’s continued use of the scanners
suggests that they believe that the scanners are a useful tool. Thus,
the effectiveness of security scanners in addressing the threat to which
they respond remains largely inconclusive. There may be some cases
where security scanners are able to detect explosives concealed on
someone’s person, but explosives concealed in someone’s person remain an entirely different story.72 Independent researchers have af67
68

Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at art. 6(1).
See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233; see supra notes 6–15 and accompa-

nying text.
69

Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at art. 6(1).
See ELIAS, supra note 44, at 4 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-401T, BETTER USE OF TERRORIST WATCHLIST INFORMATION AND
IMPROVEMENTS IN DEPLOYMENT OF PASSENGER CHECKPOINT TECHNOLOGIES COULD
FURTHER STRENGTHEN SECURITY (2010)); Gardner, supra note 6; Mironenko, supra
note 27, at 240 (noting that “neither millimeter-wave technology nor backscatters can
detect explosives carried inside the body”); Spencer S. Hsu, GAO Says Airport Body
Scanners May not Have Thwarted Christmas Day Bombing, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700649.html;
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-484T, TSA IS INCREASING PROCURMENT AND
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, BUT CHALLENGES TO THIS
EFFORT AND OTHER AREAS OF AVIATION SECURITY REMAIN (2010) (“[I]t remains
unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009
incident . . . .”).
71
Mironenko, supra note 27, at 240.
72
See id. (“[N]either millimeter-wave technology nor backscatters can detect
explosives carried inside the body.”); Leon Kaufman & Joseph W. Carlson, An
Evaluation of Airport X-ray Backscatter Units Based on Image Characteristics, 4 J.
TRANSP. SECURITY 73, 73–74 (2011)\ (“The purpose of these is to find contraband
hidden under clothing but on the surface of the traveler.”). Pelle Neroth,
Technologies to Read the Terrorist Mind, ENGINEERING & TECH. (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2011/08/beyond-body-scanners.cfm. Body scanners
70
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firmed this, stating that “[e]ven if exposure were to be increased significantly, normal anatomy would make a dangerous amount of plastic
explosive[s] with tapered edges difficult if not impossible to detect.”73
This fact makes it more difficult to justify the use of security scanners
under the relevant and proportional standards adopted by EU law.
C.

Health Concerns

The EC urges EU member states to conduct their own risk assessments in determining whether the use of non-ionizing or ionizing
radiation is appropriate and justified. The exposure to radiation
caused by security scanners creates an obvious health concern. Different security scanner systems use different technologies; thus, these
health concerns must be considered on a system-by-system basis.74
The EU Communication addresses the four primary technologies utilized in security scanners: passive millimeter-wave imaging systems,
active millimeter-wave imaging systems, X-ray backscatter, and Xray transmission imaging.75
(1) The passive millimeter-wave imaging system does not
emit any radiation.76 It measures thermal radiation emitted by the
body and the environment. Since this system does not emit any
radiation dose, studies have concluded that it does not raise health
concerns.77
(2) The active millimeter-wave imaging system uses nonionizing radiation, which is generally considered less harmful than
ionizing radiation (used in X-ray systems).78 While there is some
radiation exposure, studies have suggested that the levels are equal

have “been criticised for missing the items they are supposed to spot, due to the fact
that the rays will not always penetrate thick folds of clothing. Neither can they
penetrate skin, thereby missing bomb material that may be hidden inside body
cavities.” Id.
73
Kaufman & Carlson, supra note 72, at 73. According to Kaufman and
Carlson, a dangerous amount of PETN packed in a fashion similar to normal antomy
could be missed by the scanners yet easily detected on pat down. See id. at 93.
74
See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233.
75
See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 35 (discussing the various
technologies of security scanners that are commercially available).
76
See id. at ¶ 35(1) (describing “[p]assive millimetre-wave”)
77
See id.; see also id. at ¶ 61 (“The consulted studies do not raise health
concerns when using passive millimetre wave technology.”).
78
See id. at ¶ 35(2) (discussing “[a]ctive millimetre-wave”). Id. at ¶ 63
(“Non-ionising radiation is generally considered not harmful compared to ionising
radiation, such as X-rays.”).
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to or less than “exposure levels arising from natural and everyday
activities (e.g., mobile phones and microwaves).”79
3) The X-ray backscatter system80 uses ionizing radiation and
as such, is subject to the dose limits established by Euratom. 81
Although security scanners will expose passengers to ionizing radiation, the dose is low. The EC concluded that it would take approximately forty screenings per day for a passenger to reach the
dose limit provided by Euratom. 82
4) The X-ray transmission imaging system emits a much higher dose than the backscatter system. Therefore, transmission imaging is not intended for systematic screening uses. 83 X-ray transmission screening is generally reserved for police purposes. Due
to the aforementioned risks and the availability of non-ionizing or
low dose ionizing radiation systems, the transmission imaging system is not used in Europe for aviation security. 84

On February 16, 2011, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) an important and powerful advisory body that represents civil society organizations across Europe, issued a very critical
opinion on the 2008 EC Communication to the EP.85 While the EESC
79

Id. at ¶ 65 (citing the centre for Occupational Health and Safety, which
measured the intensity of electromagnetic waves at 2 W/m2 (watt per square meter)
the leak level for domestic ovens; this value is considerably lower than the 10 W/m2
(50 W/m2) official power density exposure limit).
80
See generally Kaufman & Carlson, supra note 72 (discussing efficacy of
x-ray backscatter machines for scanning airport passengers); George Zentai, X-ray
Imaging for Homeland Security, 3 INT’L J. OF SIGNAL & IMAGING SYS. ENGINEERING
13, 14–15 (2010) (discussing use of x-ray technology for luggage and packages).
81
See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 35(3) (discussing X-ray
backscatter technology). Id. at ¶ 66 (discussing health effects of X-ray backscatter
technology); Council Directive 96/29, 1996 O.J. (L 159) 1, 7–9 (Euratom), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radioprotection/doc/legislation/9629_en.pdf.
82
See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 67.
83
See id. at ¶ 35(4) (discussing “X-ray transmission imaging” technology).
Id. at ¶ 69 (discussing health effects of X-ray transmission imaging).
84
See id. at ¶ 70.
85
See EESC Opinion, supra note 41. According to the EESC website: “The
EESC contributes to strengthening the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the
European Union by enabling civil society organisations from the Member States to
express their views at European level. This Committee fulfils three key missions:

helping to ensure that European policies and legislation tie in better with eco-



nomic, social and civic circumstances on the ground, by assisting the European Parliament, Council and European Commission, making use of EESC
members’ experience and representativeness, dialogue and efforts to secure
consensus serving the general interest;
promoting the development of a more participatory European Union which is
more in touch with popular opinion, by acting as an institutional forum representing, informing, expressing the views of and securing dialogue with organised civil society;
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does not wholly oppose the use of security scanners at EU airports, it
stated that, “All in all, there are serious doubts, not as to the legality,
but rather the legitimacy of the communication . . . the Commission
should have taken far greater care when drawing up such a controversial proposal.”86 The EESC even criticized the EC for using the term
“security scanners,” as opposed to “body scanners,” which was the
term previously used by the EP.87 The EESC claimed that the EC’s
new terminology constitutes “an attempt to make the communication
more politically attractive with a view to its adoption.”88
Despite its criticisms of the EC Communication, the EESC’s reservations primarily concern the extent to and manner in which the EC
endorses the use of security scanners. The EESC’s objections focus
on (1) the lack of alternative screening methods offered to passengers,89 (2) the legal justifications for exposing passengers to potentially harmful doses of ionizing radiation,90 (3) concern that the EC has
not conducted an adequate proportionality test that weighs the need to
adopt the use of security scanners with other relevant factors,91 and (4)
the EC’s suggestion that security scanners can replace existing methods of screening like searches by hand and WTMD.92
The EESC insisted that legislation be introduced guaranteeing
passengers the right to undergo alternative screening methods. It stated that “passengers should be allowed to opt out of such checks and
should always maintain the right to fly, regardless of the option they
choose.”93 While the EC Communication does not rule out the idea of
offering alternative screening methods to passengers, it does not force
member states to do so. Thus, the EESC opinion challenges the
stance taken by the UK government, which does not require airports
to offer passengers alternative methods after they have refused to be
scanned. Moreover, the EESC maintains that there should be legisla-



promoting the values on which European integration is founded and advancing, in Europe and across the world, the cause of democracy and participatory
democracy, as well as the role of civil society organisations.

About

the

Committee,

EUROPEAN

ECON.

&

SOC.

COMM.,

http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.about-the-committee (last visited Feb.
20, 2012).
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

See EESC Opinion, supra note 41, at 3.8 – 3.8.2.
Id. at 3.7.1.
Id. at 1.2, 3.7.2.
Id. at 3.1.2, 3.6.1.
Id. at 3.6.
Id. at 3.1.2.
Id. at 3.7 – 3.7.6.
Id. at 1.2.
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tion preventing airports from subjecting passengers to undue delays
after they have refused scanning.94
On the subject of health, the EESC urged the EC to provide conclusive studies on the health risks associated with the use of security
scanners.95 As noted above, EU member states are bound by the Euratom Treaty, which sets radiation dose exposure limits on an ad hoc
basis. Before exposing passengers to radiation, the appropriate authorities must provide a legitimate justification and demonstrate that
there are sufficient protective measures in place to ensure the lowest
possible levels of exposure.
The EESC opinion also noted that point 34 of the EC Communication suggests that scanners may replace existing methods of security
screening, which the EESC argues is too narrow of an approach at a
time when there are so many uncertainties as to the legality, technology, health risks, and effectiveness of security scanners.96 The EESC
therefore concluded, that, rather than try to expedite the use of security scanners in as many EU airports as possible, “it would be more
logical, given the fast-developing market, to wait for other technology
that is more advanced, less intrusive and more in line with the objective to be achieved—namely, aviation security.”97
The EESC urged the EC to establish a clear legal framework for
including security scanners in the acceptable methods of screening. In
doing so, the EC must satisfy the standards provided by EU law. According to the EESC, the EC Communication “does not appear to
comply fully with the criteria of necessity, proportionality, and legality that must be displayed by any measure adopted by the public authorities.”98 As to the principle of necessity, the EESC considers the
link between the scanners and higher levels of security to be “tenuous.”99 Regarding proportionality, the EESC urged the EC to weigh
“the need for its adoption with other factors, such as the potential
costs of setting up such security scanners.”100 Finally, in terms of
legality, the EESC demanded that the EC address the concerns raised
in regard to the CFR and the ECHR in a manner that creates a sense of
clarity.101 The EESC noted that the “rights and freedoms most affected are almost exclusively those forming what the European Court of
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id. at 1.3, 3.5.
Id. at 3.7.3 – 3.7.6.
Id. at 3.1.2.
Id. at 3.2.
Id. at 3.2.1.
Id. at 3.1.2.
Id. at 1.2, 3.3.3
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Human Rights considers the untouchable hard core of public policy
established by the European Convention of Human Rights.”102 Therefore, procedural safeguards must be put in place that protect the individual rights of passengers, most notably in terms of human dignity,
data protection, and health.
On July 6, 2011, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a nonbinding resolution on the use of security scanners at airports in EU
member states.103 In many ways, the EP resolution mirrors the suggestions made in the EESC opinion. The EP called on the EC to add
security scanners to the list of authorized screening methods, under
the condition that such authorization will be accompanied by minimum standards and procedural safeguards.104 For instance, the EC
must demonstrate that the use of security scanners will not “constitute
a risk to passenger health, personal data, the individual dignity and
privacy of passengers.”105 The EP recognizes that the majority of
member states acknowledge that security scanners can contribute
greatly to the goal of enhancing aviation security, particularly when it
comes to nonmetallic and liquid explosives. However, like the EESC
opinion, the EP insisted that passengers should be able to opt out of
the scanning process and participate in an alternative method.106 Furthermore, passengers who refuse to be scanned should not be looked
upon with a greater level of suspicion than those who submit to the
scanning process.107
In regard to health and privacy, the EP expressed confidence that
technology can help alleviate these concerns.108 Nevertheless, it made
clear that security scanners equipped with technology that uses ionizing radiation must be excluded from the list of acceptable screening
methods.109 This would essentially preclude the use of X-ray
backscatter and transmission imaging systems. The EP Resolution
also encouraged member states to continue testing the long-term ef-

102

Id. at 3.3.3.
European Parliament Resolution of 6 July 2011 on Aviation Security, with
a Special Focus on Security Scanners, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA-PROV(2011)0329
(2011) [hereinafter EP Resolution of 6 July 2011], available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=
P7-TA-2011-0329.
104
Id. at ¶ 9.
105
Id.
106
Id. at ¶ 20.
107
Id.
108
Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24.
109
Id. at ¶ 23.
103

HEALTH MATRIX

480

[Vol. 22: 461]

fects of radiation exposure while trying to develop scanning systems
that have no harmful side effects.110
This EP Resolution embodies a more positive view on the ability
of technology to alleviate privacy concerns. It explicitly stated that
member states must ensure a random selection process for scanning
passengers, body images must be limited to stick figures, data may
only be used for the amount of time it takes to detect threatening
items, and the data must be destroyed immediately after the passenger
has passed through the screening checkpoint.111 In order to provide
further assurances for these safeguards, security scanner use must
remain consistent with Directive 95/46/EC112 on data protection.113 In
addition, the EP member states should take steps to provide comprehensive information to passengers regarding the use of security scanners.114 Lastly, the EP affirmed its commitment to end the ban on
liquids in 2013, which should prompt member states to develop technology to address the carrying of liquids in order to ensure that the
end of the ban does not compromise security.115
The EP resolution provides insight into the future use of security
scanners at European airports. Notwithstanding provisions on human
dignity, health, data protection and privacy rights, the EP still recommended that the EC add security scanners to the list of authorized
screening methods. Taking this into consideration, it appears safe to
say that security scanners will not be phased out at European airports
anytime soon. In all likelihood, the use of security scanners will increase as the technology improves and helps alleviate human rights
concerns.
II.

THE UNITED STATES

Shortly after 9/11, the United States took a number of steps to reorganize executive agencies tasked with protecting the American pub110

Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶¶ 27 – 29, 31 – 32.
112
See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 48, at 38. Directive 95/46/EC, commonly referred to as the Data Protection Directive, provides a regulatory framework
for protecting personal information across all EU countries. Id. Article 29 of the
Directive established the “Article 29 Working Party,” an independent advisory entity
with representatives from each EU country tasked with examining questions and
providing opinions regarding data protection and privacy. See id., art. 29, 30 at 48;
Mironenko, supra note 27, at 234 n.14; Article 29 Working Party, EUR. COMM’N
DIRECTORATE-GEN’L FOR JUST., http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
113
EP Resolution of 6 July 2011, supra note 103, at ¶ 33.
114
Id. at ¶¶ 35 – 36.
115
Id. at ¶¶ 42 – 44.
111
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lic from the threat of terrorism. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 created the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). Originally part of the Department of Transportation, the TSA
was later placed under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
a cabinet level department with a staff of more than 240,000 employees.116
A.

TSA and Whole Body Imaging/Advanced Imaging
Technology

In 2007, the TSA began deploying what are commonly referred to
in the United States as Whole Body Imaging (WBI) or Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) systems in airports across the United
States.117 In a recent comment regarding this deployment, TSA administrator John Pistole said, “‘[t]he terrorists keep adapting and
evolving to try to defeat our security.’”118 These systems add an additional layer of security to address such threats. There are currently
488 WBI systems in use at seventy-eight U.S. airports. In September
2011 the TSA purchased 300 more millimeter-wave units and plans to
implement WBI at an additional twenty-nine airports.119 The TSA
uses both the millimeter-wave and X-ray backscatter systems,120 but it
does not require passengers to submit to WBI screening.121 Passengers who refuse to be scanned can receive alternative screening methods, such as a pat-down search. Also, the TSA claims that images
116
About DHS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/aboutdhs (last visited Aug. 20, 2012); Our History, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/research/tribute/history.shtm (last visited Aug. 20, 2012).
117
See Advanced Imaging Techonology: Innovation & Technology, TRANSP.
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/index.shtm (last visited Jan.
6, 2012).
118
Ross Wilkers, TSA Boss: Patdowns, Scanners Work, EXECUTIVEGOV.COM
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.executivegov.com/2011/08/tsa-boss-patdowns-scannerswork/.
119
For a list of U.S. airports that currently have imaging technology systems,
see Advanced Imaging Techonology: Frequently Asked Questions, TRANSP. SECURITY
ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/faqs.shtm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
See also Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin, TSA Announces Advanced Imaging
Technology
Deployments
at
U.S.
Airports
(Oct.
6,
2011),
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2011/1006.shtm.
120
See Frequently Asked Questions: Advanced Imaging Techonology,
TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/faqs.shtm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012).
121
See id. (“[I]maging technology screening is optional for all passengers.”).
See also ELIAS, supra note 45, at 1 (“If an individual considers this screening method
too invasive or revealing or prefers not to undergo AIT imaging for any other reason,
TSA provides the option of submitting to a pat-down search instead.”).
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from WBI systems cannot be stored, printed, or transmitted and are
immediately deleted after the passenger has passed through the security checkpoint.122
There are obvious differences between the legal approaches taken
by the United States and Europe. For instance, EU members have the
added burden of trying to institute uniform procedures and regulations
for a number of member states. In contrast, the United States is principally bound by internal laws, namely the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and above all, by the Fourth Amendment.
Just as in Europe, there are many critics of WBI in the United
States, and many air travelers believe that the use of WBI is an invasion of privacy.123 There have been a number of publicized cases
where passengers and airline staff have been denied clearance at security checkpoints after refusing to submit to scanning and the alternative pat-down search. For example, on October 15, 2010, a pilot
named Michael Roberts was prevented from passing through a security checkpoint at Memphis International Airport.124 Although Roberts
had passed through a WTMD without triggering the alarm, a TSA
official informed him that he had to remove his shoes for WBI scanning.125 Roberts refused the scanning and the official told him that as
an opt-out, he would have to submit to a pat-down search or else he
would not be allowed to pass through the checkpoint.126 Roberts
again refused and was not allowed to pass through the checkpoint.
The Rutherford Institute, a civil liberties organization that provides
free legal services to individuals involved in constitutional disputes,
has agreed to represent Roberts in making the case that WBI scanning
constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.127 Less than a
122

See Advanced Imaging Techonology: Privacy, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/privacy.shtm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (“Advanced imaging technology cannot store, print, transmit or save the image, and the
image is automatically deleted from the system after it is cleared by the remotely
located security officer.”). Cf. Mironenko, supra note 27, at 241 (positing that images
would need to be retained in the event screeners find a real terrorist or in the aftermath of a successful attack to see what went wrong).
123
See Agyemang Frimpong, Introduction of Full Body Image Scanners at
the Airports: A Delicate Balance of Protecting Privacy and Ensuring National
Security, 4 J. TRANSP. SECURITY 221, 223–25 (2011).
124
See Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2011); see also
The Rutherford Institute Agrees to Represent Michael Roberts, Airline Pilot Who
Refused to Submit to Virtual Strip Search, RUTHERFORD INST. (Oct. 21, 2010),
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/press_release_channel/The_Ruther
ford_Institute_Agrees_to_Represent_Michael_Roberts_Airline_Pilot/.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
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month later, on November 13, 2010, a passenger named John Tyner
was prevented from passing through a security checkpoint at the San
Diego Airport after he refused to submit to WBI scanning and the patdown search.128 There are a number of similarly publicized cases and
there are bound to be many more given the intention of the TSA to
increase the use of WBI scanning.129
There have also been a number of legal and administrative disputes between TSA/DHS and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). In 2010, EPIC filed two requests to DHS under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).130 EPIC requested almost every
128
See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233; Catherine Saillant, Traveler Who
Resisted TSA Pat-down is Glad His Moment of Fame is Nearly Over, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/19/local/la-me-screening-tyner20101119.
129
In Durso v. Napolitano, 795 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2011), a complaint filed on behalf of three airline passengers alleged screening methods violated
their rights under the Fourth Amendment. Durso, a recent breast cancer survivor who
had undergone a mastectomy, alleged that TSA officials had inappropriately groped
her. Id. Daniels, another of the complainants and a frequent business traveler, alleged to have been aggressively groped in his genital area when undergoing an enhanced pat-down search. Id. The third complainant, C.N., a twelve-year-old girl, was
subjected to an AIT scan without the consent of her guardians. Id. at 65–66. The
complaint was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for
lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 73. Represented by The Rutherford Institute, the plaintiffs
along with pilot Roberts, filed a consolidated appeal in the D.C. Circuit. See supra
notes 124–27 and accompanying text. See also Rutherford Institute Appeals Dismissal of Airline Passenger, Pilot Lawsuit Against DHS & TSA Over Scanners, Virtual
Strip Searches & Full-Body ‘Rub-Downs’, RUTHERFORD INST. (Jan. 3, 2012),
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/on_the_front_lines/rutherford_inst
itute_appeals_dismissal_of_airline_passenger_pilot_lawsuit_a. In Tobey v. Napolitano, No. 3:11CV154-HEH, 2011 WL 3841929, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2011),
prior to entering the AIT scanner unit, plaintiff removed his shirt revealing the text of
the Fourth Amendment, which he had written on his chest with a marker. Plaintiff
was subsequently arrested by the police at Richmond International Airport and later
filed suit alleging that defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at *3. The Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss
all counts against TSA and DHS officials on the basis that plaintiff had failed to state
a claim with sufficient specificity. See id. at *18. Finally, in Redfern v. Napolitano,
No. 10-12048-DJC, 2011 WL 1750445, at *2 (D. Mass. 2011), plaintiff brought
Fourth Amendment suit against TSA and DHS officials after being selected for AIT
scanning on six different occasions, three of which he chose to opt out and was subjected to the enhanced pat-down. The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id., at *8.
130
See Letter from Ginger P. McCall, Staff Counsel, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.
(EPIC) to Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer/Chief FOIA Officer, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., RE: Freedom of Information Act Request and Request for
Expedited
Processing
(July
13,
2010),
available
at
http://epic.org/privacy/backscatter/Body_Scanner_Radiation_FOIA.pdf; see also
Letter from Ginger P. McCall, Staff Counsel, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. (EPIC) to Kim-
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piece of information regarding WBI scanning that DHS had in its possession.131 DHS released a large volume of documentation in response, but withheld a number of images and several hundred pages
of training manuals claiming that they were exempt from FOIA because they were internal materials and could constitute a threat to
transportation security if released.132 In response, EPIC filed lawsuits
in November 2009 and January 2010, seeking the release of the information that DHS withheld.133 After both parties filed motions for
summary judgment, the District Court sided with DHS and allowed
the documents to be withheld.134 On April 21, 2010, EPIC and thirty
other organizations issued a petition to the TSA urging it to stop the
use of WBI scanning.135 EPIC continues to argue that WBI scanning
constitutes a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, the Privacy Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Fourth
Amendment.136
On April 22, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
“Aircraft Passenger Whole-Body Limitations Act of 2009,” which
prevents the use of WBI as a primary screening method.137 Similar to
the EESC, Congress was worried that the TSA might begin to rely too
heavily on WBI and use it as a primary method in lieu of pat-down
searches and WTMD.138 In fact, a bill introduced in the Senate in
2010 attempted to do just that.139 The Securing Aircraft From Exploberly Walton, Special Counselor, Transp. Sec. Admin., RE: Freedom of Information
Act
Appeal
on
TSA10-0674
(Aug.
27,
2010),
available
at
http://epic.org/privacy/body_scanners/Body_Scan_Rad_Appeal.pdf.
131
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of Homeland Security – Body Scanners – Freedom of Information Act Documents,
EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/epic_v_dhs.html#foia
(last
visited Mar. 11, 2012).
133
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4, 9 (D.D.C. 2011).
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Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy
Officer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 21, 2010) available at
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See id.; Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d
1, 5–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
137
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sives Responsibly: Advanced Imaging Recognition Act (SAFER AIR
Act) would have mandated the deployment of WBI to airports across
the country as the primary method of screening for the next two
years.140 The bill, however, failed to gain traction and died at the
committee level.141 Nevertheless, given the recent trend towards WBI
systems combined with the TSA initiative to increase the deployment
of WBI, more legislation will likely be introduced in Congress seeking to make WBI systems the primary method of screening.
B.

The Fourth Amendment

While European human rights protections against invasions of
privacy rest on the principles of relevance, objectivity, nondiscrimination, and proportionality, privacy protections in the United States rest
primarily on the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.142

In order to trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment, it
first must be determined that the actions of the government or administrative agency amounted to a search or seizure. Once it has been
determined that a search was conducted, the inquiry then turns on
whether the search was reasonable.
The special needs doctrine constitutes an exception to the Warrant
Clause requirement of standard Fourth Amendment searches.143 The
special needs doctrine acknowledges that in some circumstances, including administrative stops or inspections (e.g. systematic screenings
required for transportation security), the probable cause standard un140
Id. at § 3 (“It is the policy of the United States to aggressively seek, develop, and deploy, in a timely fashion and in sufficient numbers, primary screening
technologies capable of detecting and protecting against threats to domestic and international aviation travel that cannot be effectively and efficiently detected by other
technologies currently more commonly utilized in airports, such as metal detection.”).
141
See Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), S.3536, LIBR.
OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.03536 (last visited Jan.
5, 2012).
142
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
143
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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der the Warrant Clause becomes impracticable.144 The justification
for administrative stops and inspections remains a subject of debate.145
While some legal scholars maintain that “inspections do not amount to
a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes,” others reason that “passengers ‘consent’ to the search when they purchase their tickets.”146
Courts typically assess reasonableness on either an ad hoc basis or by
applying a balancing test.147 That is, the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights are balanced against the societal interests at stake,
which in this case include aviation security.
The balancing test largely parallels the relevance and proportionality tests applied by the EU in interpreting the CFR. Therefore, while
there are differences in terms of art, the main differences between the
U nitedStates and European approaches relate to administrative, procedural, and legitimacy issues related to the propriety of using systems that may impact upon privacy. The United States is bound by a
number of Federal Acts, but principally by the Constitution. Conversely, the EU consists of a collection of nations, which do not always see eye-to-eye on matters that have profound security and legal
implications. EU human rights laws on the use of security scanners
consist of a variety of charters, conventions, resolutions, and regulations that are interpreted differently and are given different weight by
a number of committees, organizations, and agencies.
C.

TSA Solutions

TSA has taken steps to protect the rights of passengers while using enhanced security measures. Although TSA continues to use WBI
systems with ionizing radiation doses (which the EP resolution forbids), some of the changes being made are consistent with the requests
in the EP resolution. For instance, TSA announced that it will begin
installing ATR software on all the millimeter-wave systems in use and
begin testing similar software for X-ray backscatter systems.148 This
144
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22–25 (2010); Stuart A. Hindman, Full-Body Scanners: TSA’s New “Optional”
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145
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POLICE: CASES, STATUTES AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 108 (4th ed., 2011) (citing
United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d. 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003), noting, “‘no
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146
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147
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148
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2011),
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will eliminate “passenger-specific images” and replace them with the
“stick figure” like images requested by the EP.149 Due to this change,
the screen will no longer have to be hidden from the passenger and the
reviewing TSA officer will not have to be in a remote viewing
room.150 It seems clear that policymakers and airport authorities in
the United States and Europe feel confident that technology can eliminate, or at least sufficiently mitigate, the legal concerns over the use
of WBI technology for airport screening.
CONCLUSION
This essay explains the type of plots for which security scanners
were implemented. It describes the history of al-Qaeda’s attempts to
use hidden explosives in attacks on government officials and civil
aviation. The piece explains how the European Union and the United
States implemented measures aimed at protecting privacy, dignity,
and individual liberty while balancing those values against the interest
in protecting civil aviation from terrorist plots.
The discussion suggests the following conclusions. First, the security scanners and similar systems can, with advancements in technology, become more protective of privacy interests. Specifically, as
technology advances, some systems will also be developed which will
allow the government to maximize its interest in security while also
maximizing the citizenry’s interest in remaining free from excessive
governmental intrusions into their private lives. Second, there are
obvious differences between the legal approaches taken by the United
States and European nations (such as the fact that the EU has the added burden of trying to institute uniform procedures and regulations for
a number of member states). Despite these differences, both the EU
and the United States have implemented similar air travel procedures
to protecting passenger’s privacy rights. Policymakers and airport
authorities in the United States and Europe have proven that technology can eliminate, or at least sufficiently mitigate, the legal concerns
over the use of WBI technology for airport screening.
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